Final thoughts before enlisting

Here I am, four days away.  On Sunday I enlist in the Israeli Defense Force as a veritable geriatric 25 year old volunteer.  For six months I have waited, and for the coming six months I sign away my freedom for the sake of country, career, and adventure (though I am told I shouldn't hold my breath for the latter).  Friends bombard me with the same question: "are you excited?"

My reply is typically something along the lines of "I'm keeping it at a low simmer."  

"Why?" they inquire with genuine or feigned interest and concern.  

I suppose it's because I have no inflated delusions of what my time as a soldier will be like.  I know it will-- for the very large part-- not be fun and I will be treated like a grunt.  I am fine with that.  I am too old (they told me) to serve in a combat unit and too valuable (I told them) to be wasted thus, so my brief time in the IDF will not be on the front lines or involve anything "heroic".  That's fine with me.  I've read enough Hemingway, James Jones, Wilfred Owen, and Tim O'Brian and seen "Band of Brothers", "The Pacific", and "Empire of the Sun" to have illusions of grandeur about the military.  I am not "ardent for some desperate glory" or fooled by "the old Lie: dulce et decorum est / pro patria mori".  Go ahead and scoff at my being a jobnik soldier, I don't care. 

Nonetheless, I can not help but grow anxious about my impending enlistment when Israel's neighbors are trembling with rumors of revolution.  Lebanon trembles as Hezbollah makes a parliamentary powerplay and unrest grows.  Should violence ensue, Israel's territorial integrity and security could very well be compromised.  Egypt has been wracked by days of protests and a bout of self-immolations inspired by the uprising in Tunisia and nigh unto three decades of totalitarian rule under Hosni Mubarak.  With Mubarak not getting any younger and the Muslim Brotherhood's underground popularity at an all time high, revolution in Egypt would not bode well for Israel.  Lastly-- and possibly most significantly, the Palestine Papers, released this week by al-Jazeera, have undercut Abbas and Fatah's popularity among the Palestinian public by exposing their concession of territories considered vital to the future Palestinian state.  Fluctuation in the balance of power among the Palestinian factions-- especially the empowerment of Hamas-- will certainly have averse effects for Israel.  

All I can do is wait and keep my wits about me.
I will continue writing about my experience as a soldier in the IDF, and specifically (if things play out as I've been told) as part of the Israeli military administration in the West Bank.  

Aztmaut: a return to political escapism

Cults of political personality dominate Israeli politics.  For a third time, a major political contender has diverged from his party to create a new one.  Ben Gurion divided the Mapai party in 1965 and formed Rafi, taking ten seats that election, and formed the National List party in 1969 when Mapai and Rafi reunited.  Six years ago, Ariel Sharon rived the Likud party asunder and formed Kadima around himself, forming a coalition to boot.  Yesterday, the left-leaning Labor party, already a minority in opposition, was split by Defense Minister and former Prime Minister Ehud Barak; four MKs formed the new "centrist, Zionist and democratic" Atzmaut (Independence) party.  Not without a large dose of irony, Kadima's formation five (and change) years ago proclaimed its foundation as a centrist party committed to Israel as a Jewish and democratic state advocating a two state solution, too.  
Bernard Susser and Giora Goldberg, in their 2005 Israel Affairs article "Escapist Parties in Israeli Politics", sum up "New Start" escapist parties like Atzmaut as being:

"ideologically unfocused. It is difficult to use conventional categories like left and right, dove and hawk, socialist and capitalist, establishment or anti-establishment to describe them. Their answers to political dilemmas tend to be sensational, uncomplicated and ethically charged. They promise quick results and dramatic successes. They display a low threshold for political ambiguities."

What is critical to mention is the relative success rate of these parties, and their cumulative effect on the political landscape of Israel.  Rafi dissolved three years after its formation despite its initial success, and Ben Gurion's National List party disintegrated after one term.  Kadima enjoyed three years in power before losing political steam and the election to Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu in 2009.  Now, in 2011, an already deflated Labor party has been cloven.  Barak seeks to succeed where Ben Gurion and Sharon failed by using the same tactic: rally around the figurehead.  
Not only shall his ambiguous aims not succeed, but Atzmaut will find that further division among the Israeli Left, rather than cohesion and compromise, will only yield greater isolation and failure.  Not only for the Left, but for the Israeli public as well. 
Over Israel's 62 years, Knesset parties multiply as they fracture into factions, creating ever-more political instability.  Coalition strength has declined drastically, resulting in ineffectual governments incapable of compromise and progress.  Rarely has the distribution of seats among the various parties ever been so spread out, and rarely do such configurations remain stable or succeed in reaching necessary compromises.  The ability for the legislature to arrive at a consensus will only grow increasingly difficult; adding another party to the mix only complicates matters and is sure to strengthen the ruling coalition of right-wing and religious parties and the Left and Center's expense.
Without distinct aims, and by repeating the platitudes of Kadima from the left side of the political spectrum, Atzmaut offers little to the Israeli public.